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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The quality and disclosure of financial information by firms is a subject of growing 
concern.  In view of the stunning collapse of Enron, there is proposed new regulation and 
pressure on the SEC to get tough on corporate reporting. In fact the SEC1 is soon expected to 
initiate a Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) case. In addition, the SEC announced in February that 
it was set to issue a number of proposals that would result in a greater amount of information 
being available to investors on a timelier basis.2 It is in this backdrop that the impact of the 
existing Regulation FD is being analyzed. 
Regulation FD imposes new requirements on the voluntary disclosure practices of 
corporations. The Regulation requires corporations not to disclose news about significant 
business developments to a select few. Instead, they should disclose any material information 
publicly to all market participants using methods like public filing with the SEC, press 
statements, webcasts and other methods. Public disclosure must take place simultaneously for 
intentional disclosures or promptly3 for non-intentional disclosures. 
I.i Background and Scope 
The SEC adopted Regulation FD on 23rd October 2000 out of concerns about selective 
disclosure - corporations providing material, non-public information to certain persons, typically 
security analysts and institutional investors. The arguments against selective disclosure are: (a) 
Investor confidence: a privileged few gain significant informational advantage and are able to 
trade on that information at the expense of the other market participants. It is felt that the practice 
of selective disclosure would cause investors to lose confidence in the fairness of the markets, its 
                                                 
1 ‘SEC seen bringing pro forma, Reg FD cases soon’, Reuters, 31Dec2001 
2 ‘SEC Plans New Disclosure Rules To Speed Corporate Filings’, Dow Jones News Wire, 5Mar2002 
3 Promptly is defined as soon as reasonably possible with the outer bound being the later of 24 hours or the 
commencement of next day’s trading on NYSE. 
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economic impact being similar to that of insider trading. (b) Analyst bias: corporate management 
could use material information to gain favors from analysts and investors. Analysts feel 
pressured to write favorable reports in order to have continued access to selectively disclosed 
material information. 
In order to ensure that Regulation FD does not have a chilling effect on the disclosure of 
information by corporations, its scope is restricted to communication with security market 
professionals4. A person is liable under this Regulation when he is guilty of knowing or is 
reckless in not knowing that the information selectively disclosed is both material and non-
public. 
 
II. EFFECTS OF REGULATION FD 
 
The effects of the Regulation FD remain controversial and led to considerable debate in 
the business press. The supporters argue that the Regulation makes the markets efficient by 
increasing the amount of information available to the public. Critics however argue that 
companies now disclose less in terms of quantity and quality of information to both analysts5 and 
the market in general. This they believe has led to increased market volatility6 due to poorer 
dissemination of information. Thus in the 18 months since its implementation there still remains 
a divergence of views on whether the Regulation has changed the market for the better, though 
the majority belief is that the Regulation has lead to an increase in the quantity of information.  
                                                 
4 This includes broker-dealers, investment advisors, investment companies/hedge funds; and to holders of securities 
under circumstances where it is foreseeable that the holders may trade on the basis of the information.  See Final 
Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading for details. 
5 Analysts still continue to argue that the quality of substantive information has decreased due to the regulation. The 
latest Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR) survey of US members, 18th Oct 2001, has 
between 43-54% of respondents stating that specific types of information are less available as compared to 5-16% 
stating that these types are more available. 
6 ‘What Hath Regulation FD Wrought?’ , Business 2.0, 24May2001. Critics argue that companies are hamstrung by 
what they can and cannot say – thus all investors are equally baffled leading to more volatility. 
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There is significant anecdotal evidence for increase in quantity of information in the form 
of companies regularly offering guidance on their earnings and investors being able to hear 
practically all the conference calls over the internet. A recent survey of CFOs7 showed that 43% 
of respondents believe that Regulation FD has increased disclosure of public information while 
26% say that it has impeded it. 
In terms of the market impact, most of the information available is in the form of survey 
results. While there is general belief that the Regulation has led to a more ‘level playing field’, 
its impact in terms of quality of information to the public continues to remain controversial. A 
PricewaterhouseCoopers8 survey has 90% of the respondents stating that Regulation FD should 
be continued, however the same survey has only 29% noting a higher quality of reporting (4% 
lower quality). 
The few academic studies that have been done have yielded mixed results. Heflin, 
Subramanyam and Zhang (2001) have found that after the implementation of Regulation FD 
there are (a) lower return volatility around earnings announcements; (b) some improvement in 
the speed with which pre announcement earnings price converges to its post announcement level; 
(c) no reliable evidence of change in various aspects of analysts forecast bias, accuracy, and 
dispersion; and (d) increase in the quantity of the firms’ voluntary forward looking disclosures. 
Overall they conclude that there is no evidence to support the critics that public information 
regarding corporate earnings available to capital markets have deteriorated. The result of a paper 
by Straser (2001) suggests that while the Regulation is successful in increasing the quantity of 
                                                 
7 ‘Making Peace with Reg FD’, Institutional Investor, Dec 2001. Results of CFO forum, a quarterly survey of an 
universe of 1,600 CFOs. 
8 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Management Barometer, 17th Oct 2001. 101 CFOs and Managing Directors were 
interviewed in 2Q01. 
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publicly available information, it does not have any significant impact on the quality of that 
information.  
II.i Research Questions 
In the face of the increased focus on corporate disclosure policies, this paper looks at the 
historical impact of Regulation FD both from a micro perspective on companies’ disclosure 
policies and from a macro perspective on the efficiency of the financial markets. Specifically the 
paper takes (a) a descriptive look at the quantity and methods of disclosures and the incremental 
information available to the market, and (b) tests historical data to see if the Regulation has led to 
any measurable improvement in the efficiency of the market in terms of reduced volatility or less 
excess returns following earnings announcements. 
 
III.  DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF DISCLOSURES 
 
III.1 Methodology of Disclosures 
 
The regulation has caused companies to alter their disclosure practices. Following the 
Regulation there are two methods of public disclosure: (a) By furnishing or filing9 with the SEC 
a Form 8-K disclosing the information. (b) By disseminating the information through other 
methods of disclosure like press releases, conferences – either public, telephonic or webcast. 
III.2 Increase in Quantity of Disclosures 
Companies are increasingly providing fully accessible, non-exclusionary Webcast or 
telephonic conference as a means to achieve real-time, full and fair disclosure. There is a lot of 
secondary evidence that points to a significant increase in disclosure using methods like 
                                                 
9 Filing will subject the issuer to liability under Section 18 of the Exchange Act and incorporation into issuer’s 
Securities Act registration statements and liability under Section 11 of Securities Act. 
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webcasting.10 While other methods has emerged as more important for disclosing Regulation FD 
information, a lot of companies follow a combination of Form 8-K and other methods.  
III.3 Evidence from S&P100 Companies – Incremental Information 
Form 8-K filings remain the most straightforward disclosure option. In order to look at 
the nature of incremental disclosure by companies, disclosures furnished under Item 9 for the 
Form 8-K have been looked at using data available on SEC’s EDGAR database. Disclosures 
filed under Item 5 of Form 8-K were available to investors prior to Regulation FD and hence not 
considered incremental in nature. Data about disclosures using other methods are difficult to 
track without using company surveys and have been left out for the purposes of this study. 
The S&P100 companies11 have been analyzed to study their incremental filings. A 
database of their Regulation FD releases under Item 9 of Form 8-K for the year 2001 has been 
compiled from the SEC’s EDGAR database. The data shows a huge variation in the number of 
Regulation FD disclosures that companies have reported under this method. There were 109 
reports under Item 9 of Form 8-K ranging from zero to 10 as detailed in Appendix I.  
The evidence from the S&P100 companies seems to indicate limited incremental 
reporting by way of furnishing under Form 8-K. The reasons include that companies prefer other 
methods as seen from secondary evidence and they have not significantly changed disclosure 
practices. In addition, there is no observable trend in terms of the sector or industry group and 
the number of reporting under Item 9 of Form 8-K. 
 The nature of the reporting are predominantly earnings information (73%) be it 
disclosure to analysts being reported or earnings expectations/guidance being conveyed to the 
public as listed in Table I. The other significant reason for reporting are M&A or change in 
                                                 
10 Special Study: Regulation FD Revisited, by the SEC notes that according to a wire service representative the 
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assets (14%). Of the 100 companies studied only one (Williams Cos.) has made an unintentional 
disclosure that they subsequently disclosed using Form 8-K. 
Table I: S&P 100 Index - Type of Reporting in Form 8-K Under Item 9 
Release type %(2001) 
(1) Earnings information 73% 
(3) Mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets 14% 
(4) New products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers 3% 
(5) Changes in control or in management 0% 
(6) Change in auditors or other reporting related issues. 3% 
(7) Events regarding the issuer's securities  7% 
(8) Bankruptcies or receiverships. 0% 
 
 Significantly, the content of the disclosures indicates that Regulation FD is important to 
allay market concerns during periods of market crisis. Many companies made disclosures 
regarding the impact of Sep11th on their operations. Again number of companies quantified the 
impact of the collapse of Enron on their operations in their Regulation FD disclosures. 
 
IV. EVENT STUDY FOR MARKET IMPACT ON ADR’S 
 
The market impact of Regulation FD – whether it has led to a reduction in volatility or 
less excess returns following earnings announcements has been studied. The method used has 
been to look at foreign private issuers12 who are excluded from Regulation FD - hence these 
disclosure rules do not apply to ADRs13. While the financial information disclosure practices by 
ADRs remain unchanged, the underlying US market has been impacted by the Regulation.  
The excess returns on ADRs during earnings announcements have been calculated to see 
if there is any significant divergence during the period after the implementation of Regulation 
                                                                                                                                                             
number of corporate webcasts on its services increased from 3,000 in 1Oct2000 to 11,000 in 23Apr2001.  
11 http://www.spglobal.com/indexmain100_data.html 
12 As defined in Rule 405 of Securities Act 
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FD. If the market has indeed become more efficient there should be a shift in the distribution of 
excess returns on ADR stocks towards increased volatility and increased returns. The S&P 500 
index has been chosen as a proxy for the market of US stocks. 
The a priori hypothesis being that Regulation FD has had no effect on the market (S&P 
500) and there is no divergence in ADRs returns or volatility in the period before and after the 
implementation of Regulation FD. 
IV.1 Sample Selection 
 
There are around 511 ADR stocks trading on the  NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stock 
exchanges. A sample of 70 of these ADR stocks have been selected using the Citibank ADR 
database based on the ADRs being active on the US stock exchange for more than 20 months 
and having done a capital raising event of more than $250 million. See Appendix II for the list of 
ADRs selected. The stocks price data was obtained from the Yahoo! Finance daily closing stock 
price data sets. Daily stock price data going upto 24 months (minimum 20 months) has been 
obtained for all the ADR stocks. 
IV.2 Excess Returns Calculation 
Ei = Ri - β*Rm Excess Returns (Ei) is defined as the stock returns adjusted for risk and the 
market i.e. daily stock return less expected return. The expected return from 
the stock is β*(daily return on market). 
Where β The regression Beta obtained from finding the slope of the regression between 
market returns and the excess returns over the two-year period. 
Ri Daily return on the stock 
Rm Daily return on the market (S&P500) 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 ADRs are excluded from Regulation FD since they are an offering of the type described in  Rule 415(a)(1)(i)-(vi) 
of Securities Act 
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IV.3 Event Date Selection 
 Two events dates have been chosen – Event I in 2001 after the Regulation has impacted 
the market and Event II in 2000 when the Regulation has not impacted the market. Where 
available, event dates are the quarterly/annual interim results dates as per the press release report 
date (Data from text of press releases available on Thomson Financial). Alternatively where 
release reports are not dated, probable release dates have been obtained using the receipt date of 
the report by Thomson Financial or else the dates for filing annual reports (Form 20-F)14 with 
SEC. Where no information was available on SEC/Thomson Financial databases regarding 
quarterly/annual interim results date, the release dates have been obtained from press releases 
from Proquest news search or directly from the company website. 
Excess returns for 11 days (5 days before and 5 days after) have been calculated for every 
event. A large event window has been taken given that for ADR stocks information takes longer 
to get assimilated into the stock data. Data for the excess returns are listed in Appendix III. 
IV.4 Volatility Analysis 
 
The first assumption tested is whether there has been any change in the volatility of the 
market. This has been done by looking at whether there has been any significant change in the 
variance of the market following the implementation of the Regulation.15  
I have tested whether the sample of excess returns (Event I and Event II) have been taken 
from two distributions that have equal variance. Descriptive statistics for both Bartlett’s test and 
Levene’s test has been computed. While both these tests check for unequal variance, Bartlett’s 
test is valid when the data comes from normal distributions. Bartlett’s test is thus not robust to 
departures from normality. Given the box plot of the data, and the know properties of stock 
                                                 
14 This is an integrated form used both as a registration statement for purposes of registering securities of qualified 
foreign private issuers under Section 12 or as an annual report under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the '34 Act. 
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markets, Levene’s test16 that assumes that data come from continuous, but not necessarily normal 
distributions is more appropriate. The raw data has been updated for outliers to result in 59 data 
points. 
At a 95% level of significance I find no evidence that the variances of the two samples 
are different. See Appendix IV for descriptive statistics and graphs. Thus I conclude that there is 
no significant statistically observable change in volatility in the market in the 2001 due to 
Regulation FD. 
IV.5 Difference in Means 
 Next by doing an event study I test to see if there is an increase in excess returns for 
earnings announcements for ADR stocks. 
Given that the two samples are not independent, since data are obtained over two 
different time periods, a paired-sample method has been used to look at the difference in 
means17. See Appendix V for descriptive statistics and graphs. The results of the paired t-test 
indicate that there is no statistically significant movement in the means over the two periods. 
Thus I find no evidence to suggest that the excess returns on ADRs have increased over the 
period following the implementation of the Regulation FD. 
 
V. SUMMARY 
 
The report first examines disclosure practices and concludes that the Regulation has led 
to an increase in quantity of disclosures. By studying Form 8-K disclosures for S&P100 
companies, I find no observable pattern in terms of the types of firms who are making the most 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 The null hypothesis of equal variances versus the alternative of not all variances being equal has been tested. 
16 The computational method for Levene’s Test considers the distances of the observations from their sample 
median rather than their sample mean. Using the sample median rather than the sample mean makes the test more 
robust for smaller samples. 
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incremental disclosures under the Regulation. Most of the incremental information that is 
available is earnings information that was previously selectively disclosed only to analysts. 
Making disclosures under the Regulation has proved to be a useful forum for companies to allay 
market concerns during periods of crisis – September 11th/Enron. 
Next by studying variances in the distribution of excess returns on ADR stocks, I find 
that after more than a year, Regulation FD has failed to live up to the dire forecasts of its critics. 
Stock market volatility has not increased, as predicted, due to this Regulation. By looking at the 
excess returns during the event period there is no evidence that the market has become more 
efficient as hoped by the advocates of the rule. 
There seems to be anecdotal evidence of the market being fairer, but no measurable 
impact on the markets. Either more time or a stronger regulation is needed to impact the markets. 
Regulation FD targets only “selective disclosure”. In order to significantly improve the market I 
believe what it also needed is a system of “current disclosure”. As Chairman Harvey Pitt18 notes, 
investors need current information, not just periodic disclosures, along with clear requirements 
for public companies to make affirmative disclosures of, and to provide updates to, 
unquestionably material information in real time. 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 We have tested the null hypothesis that there is a difference in means at a 95% level of significance. 
18 Chairman Harvey L. Pitt. "Op-Ed" for the Wall Street Journal, Dec 11, 2001 
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Table I: S&P 100 Index - Type of Reporting in Form 8-K Under Section 9  
Release type 
Number for 
year 2001 % 
(1) Earnings information - release / proforma numbers. Disclosure to analysts on 
expected results and outlook. 44 40%
(2) Earnings information - expectation / guidance. Projections for the future. 36 33%
(3) Mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets 15 14%
(4) New products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers 3 3%
(5) Changes in control or in management  0%
(6) Change in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on 
an auditor's audit report. Other reporting related issues. 3 3%
(7) Events regarding the issuer's securities -- e.g. defaults on senior securities, calls 
of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, 
changes to the rights of security holders, public or private sales of additional 
securities 8 7%
(8) Bankruptcies or receiverships. 0 0%
 109  
Note: The classification is done by reading through the text of the filing. In some 
cases the filings contain more than one type, but have been recorded under what 
was considered as the primary release type.  
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 Appendix III: Excess Returns on ADR stocks. 
     
 Issuer Ticker Event I Event II 
1 Abbey National plc ANB_PA 0.18% 2.51% 
2 ABN Amro Holding N.V. ABN 6.50% 5.88% 
3 Activcard S.A. ACTI -2.26% -12.59% 
4 Allied Irish Banks, plc AIB 1.12% 0.81% 
5 Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited ASL 17.32% -24.14% 
6 ASML Holding, NV ASML -5.83% -0.55% 
7 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group ANZ_P 0.01% 1.65% 
8 Bookham Technology plc BKHM 12.10% -6.09% 
9 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc BSY -20.41% 19.16% 
10 Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd. CHRT -0.80% 0.39% 
11 China Mobile (Hong Kong) Limited (formerly China Telecom) CHL -20.40% -0.54% 
12 CNOOC Limited CEO -7.91% -7.20% 
13 Companhia Paranaense de Energia (COPEL) ELP -6.07% 4.94% 
14 Compania Anonima Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela (CANTV) VNT -10.22% -4.17% 
15 Deutsche Telekom AG DT -9.31% -2.70% 
16 Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. ERJ -56.49% 3.65% 
17 Empresas ICA - Sociedad Controladora, S.A. de C.V. ICA -3.07% -13.81% 
18 Endesa S.A. ELE 1.37% -4.05% 
19 Energis plc ENGSY -12.50% -8.06% 
20 Eni S.p.A. E -5.83% -3.95% 
21 EPCOS AG EPC -20.79% 6.64% 
22 Equant N.V. ENT 9.99% -18.02% 
23 France Telecom FTE -24.35% -0.63% 
24 GlaxoSmithKline plc GSK -0.20% 3.27% 
25 Grupo Televisa, S.A. de C.A. TV 6.90% -1.19% 
26 Guangshen Railway Company Limited GSH 12.72% -7.39% 
27 Gucci Group N.V. GUC 4.22% 5.14% 
28 Hanaro Telecom HANA -10.96% -5.27% 
29 Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. (OTE) OTE -2.78% -1.11% 
30 Huaneng Power International, Inc. HNP 0.29% 16.62% 
31 Infineon Technologies AG IFX -7.02% -5.01% 
32 ING Groep N.V. ING -1.31% -0.60% 
33 Ispat International, N.V. IST -5.56% -9.43% 
34 Korea Electric Power Corporation  (KEPCO) KEP 0.67% -2.07% 
35 Korea Telecom Corporation KTC -4.11% -2.25% 
36 KPNQwest N.V. KQIP 42.47% 32.38% 
37 Magyar Tavkozlesi Rt. (MATAV Rt.) MTA -3.78% -3.83% 
38 National Australia Bank Limited NAB 7.00% 1.12% 
39 National Westminster Bank NWPRC -0.63% -0.39% 
40 News Corporation Limited, The NWSA -6.35% 7.95% 
41 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, NTT NTT -3.42% 1.92% 
42 Nokia Corporation NOK 14.34% -20.91% 
43 P.T. Indonesian Satellite Corporation  (Indosat) IIT 2.24% -3.56% 
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44 Partner Communications Company Ltd. PTNR 0.10% 19.12% 
45 Petrochina Co. Ltd. PTR -5.49% -4.88% 
46 Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) PHIPRA -8.04% 5.68% 
47 Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.  (POSCO) PKX 1.23% 12.03% 
48 Repsol YPF, S.A. REP 6.64% 0.56% 
49 Royal Bank of Scotland RBSPRF -0.16% -1.14% 
50 Royal KPN N.V. (formerly Royal PTT Nederland NV) KPN -21.76% 3.71% 
51 Serono S.A. SRA 1.84% -5.22% 
52 Societe Commerciale de Reassurance (SCOR) SCO -33.55% -9.58% 
53 ST Assembly Test Services Ltd. (STATS) STTS -19.84% -12.40% 
54 STET Hellas Telecommunications S.A. ( STHLY 9.07% -7.24% 
55 STMicroelectronics N.V. STM -12.97% -14.21% 
56 Swisscom AG SCM -1.29% 9.44% 
57 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. TSM 28.17% 22.79% 
58 Tele Danmark A/S TLD 6.69% -10.67% 
59 Telecom Argentina STET - France Telecom S.A. TEO 8.38% 6.22% 
60 Telecom Italia S.p.A. TIA 0.62% 4.40% 
61 Telefonica de Argentina S.A. TAR -40.91% 0.79% 
62 Telefonica del Peru S.A. TDP 9.05% -3.30% 
63 Telefonica S.A. (Formerly Telefonica de Espana) TEF 4.68% 7.39% 
64 Telefonos de Mexico S.A. de C.V. TMX 1.45% -12.84% 
65 Telewest Communications plc TWSTY 18.37% -15.68% 
66 Total Fina Elf S.A. TOT -7.87% -0.69% 
67 Transportadora de Gas del Sur, S.A. (TGS) TGS -2.35% 10.91% 
68 TV Azteca, S.A. de C.V. TZA 1.09% 6.28% 
69 Unibanco - Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros S.A. UBB -27.09% 6.13% 
70 YPF Sociedad Anonima YPF -1.06% 0.12% 
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Appendix IV 
 
Test for Equal Variances – Raw Data 
 
Level1 event 1
Level2 event 2
ConfLvl 95.0000
Bonferroni confidence intervals for standard deviations
Lower Sigma Upper N Factor Levels
0.121297 0.144532 0.178207 70 event 1
0.082125 0.097856 0.120656 70 event 2
F-Test (normal distribution)
Test Statistic: 2.181
P-Value : 0.001
Levene's Test (any continuous distribution)
Test Statistic: 2.647
P-Value : 0.106
0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
95% Confidence Intervals for Sigmas
event 2
event 1
-0.5 0.0 0.5
Boxplots of Raw Data
F-Test
Test Statistic: 2.181
P-Value       : 0.001
Levene's Test
Test Statistic: 2.647
P-Value       : 0.106
Factor Levels
event 1
event 2
test for change in variance
 5 
Test for Equal Variances – Adjusted Data – Outliers removed 
Level1 event 1
Level2 event 2
ConfLvl 95.0000
Bonferroni confidence intervals for standard deviations
Lower Sigma Upper N Factor Levels
6.01E-02 7.27E-02 0.091762 58 event 1
6.69E-02 8.10E-02 0.102257 58 event 2
F-Test (normal distribution)
Test Statistic: 0.805
P-Value : 0.416
Levene's Test (any continuous distribution)
Test Statistic: 0.565
P-Value : 0.454
 
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
95% Confidence Intervals for Sigmas
event 2
event 1
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Boxplots of Raw Data
F-Test
Test Statistic: 0.805
P-Value       : 0.416
Levene's Test
Test Statistic: 0.565
P-Value       : 0.454
Factor Levels
event 1
event 2
test for change in variance
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Appendix V  
 
Paired T-Test and CI: event 1, event 2 
 
Paired T for event 1 - event 2
N Mean StDev SE Mean
event 1 58 -0.0035 0.0727 0.0095
event 2 58 -0.0169 0.0810 0.0106
Difference 58 0.0134 0.1122 0.0147
95% CI for mean difference: (-0.0161, 0.0429)
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 0.91 P-Value = 0.365
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Boxplot of Differences
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